United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit



APPENDIX

76-1450

United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit

BPS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee.

-against-

MAX JIMENEZ and JAMES H. MALONE,

Appellants.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York

APPELLANTS' JOINT APPENDIX

JAY GREGORY HORLICK

Attorney for Appellant Malone

MICHAEL S. WASHOR

Attorney for Appellant Jimenez

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rooklyn, New York 11241

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LOCKET ENTRIES (MALONE) 2 0715 HSTRATE or 2 7 1 Disp./Sentence defendent JAMES H. MALONE effet Office. COUN 6-241, 242 & 6 Did conspire with another against BAIL GRELEASE rights of cirizens and deprivation of , Unsecured Bond Denied rights under color of law, cro AMT - Conditional Release Set (000) J 10% C LI Surety Bone (Colleteral DANIEL FUSIED, CUR GOND CIRCA Beil Not _Other . PD. L.CD 3rd Party Detuns U.S. Attorney or Aut Bail Status Custody Thomas Puccio PSA 16 Court St., Bklyn, NY11241 (See Docket) 625-6578 SENTENCE INDICTMENT DEPARRAIGNMENT TRIAL ARREST S 76 Not Guilty Voir Dire Disposition Inform tion 9/15/76 High Risk 2-20-76 3-3-76 ial Becan E Convicted On All Charge 1st Plea 5/2-16 DN U.S. Custooy Acquitted On Lesser Weived Date Design'd Regan on Above U Nolo Oftense(s) Supersading - Guilty _ Dismissed: 6/1/76 □ Indict/Info □ I Not Guilty Final Plea DWOP: DWP Noic Guilty _ Nolled/Discontinued* - Prosecution Deferred OUTCOME INITIAL/No INITIAL DATE INITIAL/No. APPEARANCE U Dismissed J Exonerated Seerch Date _ To Transfered PRELIMINARY Held for Warrent BOND EXAMINATION OR REMOVAL Return Scheduled District GJ HEARING Issued Held to Answer to U. S. f Held _ Waived Intervening AT: Indictment ☐ Not Waived INITIAL/NO Tape No. Magistrate's Initial COMPLAINT I OFFENSE (In Complaint) • Show lest names and suffice numbers of other defendants on same indictment/information - PROCEEDINGS --DATE-Before JUDD, J - Indictment filed - Bench Warrant Ordered 20-76 and Issued. Notice of Readiness for trial filed -25-76 Before WEINSTEIN J. - Case called deft present without coun-sel- case adjd to 3/3/76 at 10:30 A.M. - deft to obtain atty 2/27/76 ready for trial 4/5/76- bail contd Magis; proceedings received from S.D.Fla and filed-acknow-3/1/76 ledgment mailed for receipt of record Before WEINSTEIN J - case called - deft & counsel present -3-3-76 deft arraigned and enters a plea of not guilty -0re Trial conference held and concluded - bail of \$25,000= PRBtrial set for 4-5-76 Notice of Appearance filed 3-3-76 Copy of letter filed dated 3-10-76 received from 3-11-76 Chambers from Harvey L. Creenberg, Esq. Notice of motion filed for dismissal of the indictment 4-12-76 and Memorandum of law filed in support of motion etc. Notice of motion filed for dismissing the second count 4-13-76 of the indictment, etc. Letter filed dated 4-26-76 received from Chambers from 4-29-76 Harvey Greenber, Esq. to permit counsel to argue matter in the Court of Appeals on May 6 at 2:00 PM (trial set

		T
	IV. PROCEEDINGS (continued)	V. EXCLUD.
	in this case for May 6) Arrangements will be made to permit counsel to argued in the Court of Appeals. So by Judge Weinstein.	
5/7/76	Petition for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum filed- issued Petition for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum	-
5-13-76	Writ retd and filed - executed.	
5/18/76	Petition for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum	
5/19/76	Petition for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum filed- issued Writ retd and filed- executed	
5-20-76	Petition for Writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum	
14.	present- court reserves decision on motion to dismissiparties to submit briefs	3
5-25-76 5-26-76 5-27-76	Before WEINSTEIN J - case called - deft & atty presential ordered and BECUN - Jurors selected and sworn trial conto to May 26, 1976 at 11:am. Before WEINSTEIN J - case called - deft & atty present trial resumed - trial contd to May 27, 1976	- 1
5/27/76	Before WEINSTEIN I - Case called	
671-76	Before WEINSTEIN J - case called - deft & counsel present - rial resumed - trial contd to 6-2-76	
6/3/76	present- trual resumed- govt rests- deft's motion to dismiss enied- trial contd to 6/3/76 Before WEIN TEIN, JCase called- deft and counsel present-trial resumed-govt rests-both sides rest trial contd to 6/4/76	
6/4/76	Before WEINSTEIN, J Case called- deft and counsel present-trial resumed-order of sustenance signed-	135
6/4/76	By WEINSTEIN J Order of sustenance filed Before WEINSTEIN, J case called deft and counsel present jury retires to deliberate order of sustenance signed trial contd to 6/8/76	7.
6/7/76 6-8-76	By WEINSTEIN, J Orders(2) of sustenance filed Subposea filed received from Chambers(with notation on envelope of file signed by Weinstein, J.	

6-8+76	Before WEINSTEIN J - case called - deft & atty present - trial resumed - Jury resumes deliberations at 10:am - Order of suscenance
<u> </u>	Turn recumes deliberations at 2 PM -Jury returns
F	
1 324 3	guilty as to count 2 as to each deft - jury polled and discharged -
1.47	all motions adjd to June 29, 1976 at 9:30 am - bail limits extended
	to Fla. as to deft MALONE - sentences adjd without date.
3	to Fla. as to delt Fallotte sensones filed (Lunch)
6-8-76	By WEINSTEIN J - Order of sustenance filed (Lunch) 4 stenographers transcripts filed (one dated May 25, June 2,
¥6-8-76	4 stenographers transcripts lifed (one detection)
19 10	June 3 and June 4 , 1976 respectively)
6-9-7	3 stenographers transcripts filed (one dated May 26, May 27
4 74 .	and one dated June 1, 1976)
6/10/76	Stenographes Transcript dated 6/8/76
6-24-7	Writs returned and filed/executed as to Louis Ortega & Francisco Cuevas. Stenographers transcript dated 6/30/76 filed.
12770	The smanner of the counsel present. Deft
9-17-1	sentenced to 7 years imprisonment on count 1 and 1 year imprisonment
-	on count 3 to run concurrently. Stay of execution of sentence pending
,	appeal is granted. Deft may travel to and from Florida to conduct his
	business. Deft O.R.
	GJudgment and commitment filed. Certified copies to US Marshal.
124/76	Notice of Appeal filed. 6 Docket entries and duplicate of Notice of Appeal sent to the C of A.
/28/76	By WEINSTEIN, J Ordered that the Petitioner - Fernando Martinez, be permitted to obtain the necessary treatments to correct his current
	permitted to ob ain the necessary treatments to correct into contents
p	dental problems from his private dentist, Dr. Jesse Lev of 4401 Avenue
	p, Brooklyn, New York.
0/7/76	oucher for compensation filed for expert services. 6 Record on appeal certified and minted to the Court of appeals.
10/14/	6 Record on appeal cores and the
	T x33
	D) 1710
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(a) Petitions(3) for writ of habeas corpus as testificandu filed- issued inserted in CK file Writ rate and filed - executed. Writs retd and filed - Executed (2 writs) Lette filed dated 4-26-76 received from Chambers from Harvey L. Greenberg, Esq. to permit counsel to argue matter in the Court of Appeals on May 6 at 2:00 PM. (trial set in the case for May 6) Arrangements will be made to permit counsel to argue in the Court of Appeals. So Ordered by Judge Weinstein Petition for writ of habeas corpus ad presequences filed- assued Petition for writ of habeas corpus ad property filed- issued Petition for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 5-18-76 filed - issued Petition for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 5/18/76 filed-issued Petition for writ of habeas corpus ad testifican dum 5/19/76 filed- issued Writ read and filed- executed 5/19/76 Petition Sarharitsofphabeas corpus ad prosequendum filled. 5-20-76 Writ issued. 250 Before WEINSTEIN, J .- Case malled- deft and counsel 5/21/76 present-court reserves decision on motion to dismiss parties to submit briefs Before WEINSTEIN J - case called - defts & counsels 5-25-76 present - trial ordered and BECUN - Jurors selected and sworn - trial contd to May 26, 1976 at 11:am. Before VEINSTEIN . - case called - deft & counsel 5-26-76 present - trial resumed - trial contd to 5-27-76. Writ read and filed - executed. 5-27-76 Before /EINSTEIN, J. - Case called - deft and counsel present - trial resumed - trial contd to 6/1/76 5/27/76 Before W INSTEIN J - case called - deft & counsel 6-1-76 present - trial resumed - trial contd to 6-2-76. 6/2/76 Before W.INSTEIN, J. - Case called - deft and counsel present-trial resumed-govt rests- deft's motion to dismiss denied-trial contd to 6/3/76 at 10:00 A.M. Before WEINSTEIN, J .- Case called-deft and counsel 6/8/76 present trial resumed govt rests-both defts rest trial contd to 6/4/76 Before WINSTEIN, J.-Case called- deft and counsel 6/4/76 present- trial resumed-order of sustenance signed trial contd to 6/7/76 at 10:00 A.M. By WEIN: TEIN, J .- Order of sustenance filed 6/4+76 677776 Before WEINSTEIN, J .- Case called- deft and counsel present crial resumed- jury retires to deliberate order of sustenance signed-trial contd to 6/8/76 6/7/76 By WEINSTEIN, J .- Orders (2) of sustenance filed

PHOCEEDINGS

	PROCEEDINGS
Carre of the same	5 Ti
8-76	Subpoena filed received from Chambers (with notation on envelope
	to docket and file (see notation of Judge Weinstein dated June 8
- W. 1	on the envelope)
6-3-76	Before WEINSTEIN J - case called - deft & atty present - trial resumed - Jury resumes deliberations at 10:00 am - order of
· v	sustenance signed (lUnch) Jury resumes deliberations at 2 PM.
3 44	Jury returns at 4:PM and renders a verdict of guilty as to
600	counts 1 and 3 as to both defts; not guilty as to count 2 as to
100	both defts - Jury polled and discharged - all motions adjd to
4.3.	June 29, 1976 at 9:30 am - bail limits extended to Fla. as to deft
1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1	MALONE - sentences adjd without date.
321.4	MALONE - sentences adjustenance filed (lunch)
6-8-76	By WEINSTEIN J - Order of sustenance filed (lunch)
6-8-76	4 stenographers transcripts filed (one dated May 25, June 2,
7	June 3 and June 4 1976 respectively. 3 stenographers transcripts filed (one dated May 26, May 27
\$ 6-9-76	3 stenographers transcripts 122ed (con-
	and one dated June 1, 1976)
6/10/76	Stenographer: Transcipts dated 6/8/76 filed 6Writs returned and filed/executed as to Louis Ortega & Francisco &ueyas.
6-24-7	Writs returned and liled/executed up to the liminer & counsel
6-30-7	Before WEINSTEIN J - case called - deft Jiminez & counsel present - Post trial motions are denied - defts motion to
	set aside the verdict of denied - So Ordered.
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Writ retd and filed - executed (witness)
8-6-76	1 - Organist adated b/ W//D II EG.
/14/76	Trans to Trans Weinstein from Michael S. Washor, asc. requesting the
114/10	a hearing be held 2 days prior to said date of sentencing.
9-17-7	6Before WEINST IN, J Case called. Deft & counsel present. Deft
	1 year on court 3 to run concurrently. Stay of execution of sentence
	granted pending appeal. Deft O.R.
	6 Judgment and commitment filed. Certified copies to US Marshal.
- 101 176	lucition of Americal filled
9/24/76	Docket entries and Cuplicate of Motice of Appeal mailed to the Col A.
3/29/76	The correct to record that the petitioner be permitted to obtain.
2110110	the meeting of the to correct als current cental problems 170a
	I have a long or a let. Dr. Jesse lev of 4001 Avenue D, Brooklyn, New Yor
	(" titioner - Went odo Martiner)
10/7/70	meloir for conjugation for experi services
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accord on appeal	certified and	mialed t	o the Court o	f Appeals.	
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

- against -

MAXIMO H. JIMINEZ and JAMES H. MALONE,

Defendants.

76 CR 133

(18 U. S. C., Section 241 18 U. S. C., Section 242 18 U. S. C., Section 2)

The Grand Jury Charges:

COUNT ONE

ative unit within the Narcotics Bureau of the New York Cit Police Department entitled the Special Investigations Unit (SIU). The jurisdiction of SIU was citywide and its function was to gather evidence for the arrest and prosecution of major narcotics violators. During the aforesaid period, MAXIMO H. JIMINEZ and JAMES H. MALONE, the defendants, and Dominick Butera, now deceased and named nerein as a co-compirator and not as a defendant, were members of GIU and, as such, were police officers acting under color of the law of the State of New York.

of the fill can proverted and subordinated to the end of obtaining summ of memory for its members, including the defendants, through their and extertion from narcotics dealers and suspects who were the subjects of their investigations. In short, the principal purpose of the leventinations conducted by members of SIU, includ-

ing the defendant, was not to convict those illegally engaged in the nameotics trace, but to enrich the members of the SIU through repeated violations of the Constitution of the United States, the laws of the State of New York and the regulations of the Police Department of the City of New York.

- 3. The illegal activity of the various members of the SIU, including the defendants, was undertaken with the knowledge and cons at of the other members of SIU and could not have succeeded without their joint cooperation.
- 4. On or about and between the 1st day of January 1969 and the 30th day of December 1971, both dates being approximate and inclusive, within the Eastern District of New York and elsewhere, for the purpose of carrying out the illegal SIU activities heretofore described, MAXIMO H. JIMINEZ and JAMES H. MALONE, the defendants, together with Dominick Butera and other co-conspirators known and unknown to the Grand Jury, wilfully, knowingly and unlawfully combined, conspired, confederated and agreed together and with each other to use their authority as police officers acting under color of the law of the State of New York to injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate citizens in the free exercise and enjoyment of rights and privileges secured to them by the Constitution of the United States.
- and their co-conspirators wilfully, knowingl, and unlawfully would use their huthority as police officers acting under color of the law of the State of New York to obtain money by theft, extortion and other unlawful scans from Issuel Cuinones, John Boland and William Armena, who were of imens of the United States, thereby injuring, of the sain table in the free exercise

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Constitution of the United States, namely, the right not to be deprived of property without due process of law.

6. It was further a part of said conspiracy that the defendants and their co-conspirators would conceal the existence of the conspiracy and would take steps designed to prevent disclosure of their activities.

In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the objects thereof, the following overt acts, among others, were committed in the Eastern District of New York and elsewhere:

OVERT ACTS

- 1. On or about February 20, 1971, defendants JIMINEZ AND MALONE and other members of SIU divided among themselves approximately \$4,000.00 taken from the apartment of one Ismael Quinones in Brooklyn, New York.
- 2. On or about March 18, 1971, defendants JIMINAZ and MALONE and co-conspirator Butera had a conversation with John Boland and William Armond at the 114th Precinct in Queens, New York.

(Title 18, United States Code, Section 241).

COUNT TWO

The Grand Jury Purtner Charges:

On or about the 20th day of February 1971, within the Eastern District of New York, MAXIMO H. JIMINEZ and JAMES H. MALONE, the defendants, using their authority as police officers acting under color of the law of the State of New York, wilfully, know-ingly and unlawfully did take, abstract and appropriate to them-

police filled on the greatest

1 ...

Solves approximately Pour Indusand Pollars (\$4,000.00) from Ismael Clinones, an innublant of the State of New York, thereby depriving him of a right secured and protected by the Constitution of the United States, namely the right not to be deprived of property without the process of law. (Title 18, United States Code, Section 242 and Title 18, United States Code, Section 242 and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2).

COUNT THREE

The Grand Jury Further Charges:

ern district of hew York, TAXIMO H. JIMINEZ and JAMES R. MALONE, the affections, using their authority as police officers acting under color of the law of the State of New York, wilfully, knowingly and unlawfull; did take, abstract and appropriate to themselves approximately Four Thousand Five Hundred Dollars (24,500.00) from John Boland and William Armond, inhabitants of the State of New York, thereby depriving them of a right secured and protected by the Constitution of the United States, namely the right not to be deprived of property without due process of law. (Title 18, United States Code, Section 242 and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2).

A TRUE BILL.

Koluto Salella-

DAVID G. TRAGER STORMEY
United States attorney
Eastern District of No. York

alted States of	(America vs.	United Sta	tes District			
	\	L_Eastera	Dist. of W.			
DEFENDANT	. JAMES H. MALONE	_I DOCKET NO.	76 CR-133			
		ION/COMMIT	MENT ORDER			
	TODOMENTANDAROBAT	OW/COMINITE				
	In the presence of the attorney for the government the defendant appeared in person on this date		9 17 1976			
COUNSEL	WITHOUT COUNSEL However the court a have counsel appointed	dvised defendant of right to	counsel and asked whether defendant desired to			
	with counsel Harv	ey Greenberg, E				
PLEA	GUILTY, and the court being satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea,	NOLO CONTEN	DERE, NOT GUILTY			
=	There being a finding/vero ct of \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \	ILTY. Defendant is discha	rged			
	There being a finding/vero ct of \ X GUILTY	in counts 1 an	d 3			
FINDING &	Defendant has been convicted as charged of the offer and 2 in that between the year another, did conspire to will police officers, to obtain me means from others, who were ing threatening and intimidate of a right and privilege seconsmely, the right not to be did and did abstract approximately.	fully & unlawful oney by theft, e citizens of the ting them inthe ared to them by	ly use their authority as xtortion and other unlawful U.S. by injuring oppress-free exercise and enjoyment the Constitution of the U.S erty without due process of			
	The court asked whether delighten had anything to say a was shown, to appeared to the court, the most adjudged	the determined guilty as charge	and convicted and ordered that the distriction is			
	thereby communical to the controlly of the Attention Corneral	or his authorized representative	for impresonment for Epertual of			
	7 years on count 1 and 1 year imprisonment on count 3 to					
SENTENCE	anneal is granted. Defe	ndant may trave	to and from Florida			
PROBATION	to conduct his business					
			FILED			
SPECIAL			* SEP 17 1976 +			
CONDITIONS			JIML ÁM			
PROBATION			РМ			

ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS OF PROBATION In addition to the prevales. However, the forest exposed above, it is hereby ordered that the general conditions or probation, and at these solds of the public continuous of the forest extenditions of the period of probation, and at any other exposure probation, and at any other probation, one of without accommon probation period of five years period ted by low, may resuct a we fant and revoke a continuous forest exposure probation period of five years period ted by low, may resuct a we fant and revoke a continuous forest exposure probation period.

The court orders commisment to the enough of its. Attendey General and recommends,

COMMITMENT RECOMMEN-DATION It is ordered that the Clerk deliver a certified copy of this judgment and come timent to the U.S. Marshallor other qualified officer.

SIGNED BY

1 U.S. Mag. traft

Ind Bollent with 17,1976

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United States of	Americans H Mande United States District Committee
	L Eastern Dist. of NY
DEFENDANT	76 CR 133
	MANTMO H. JIMINEZ DOCKET NO.
	JUDG MENT AND PROBATION/COMMITMENT ORDER
- III	In the presence of the attorney for the government
	the defendant appeared in person on this date 9 17 1976
COUNSEL	WITH COUNSEL However the court advised defendant of right to counsel and asked whether defendant decired, to have counsel appointed by the court and the defendant thereupon waived assistance of counsel. Michael Washox, Eeq. (Name of counsel)
=	GUILTY, and the court being satisfied thatNOLO CONTENDERE,NOT GUILTY
PLEA	there is a factual basis for the plea,
	There being a finding/verdict of \(\times \) NOT GUILTY. Defendant is discharged \(\times \) GUILTY. counts 1 and 3
FINDING &	Defendant has been convicted as charged of the offense(s) of violating T-18, U.S.C.Secs.241,242 and 2 in that between the years 1969 1971, the defendant, with another, did conspire to wilfully and unlawfull, use their authority as police officers to obtain money by theft, extortion and other un- lawful means, from others, who were citizens of the U.S. by injuring oppressing, threatening and intimidating them in the free exercise and
	of the U.S. namely the right not to be deptived of property without due of the U.S. namely the right not to be deptived of property without due
	Girlo Forest and the sale of an had anything to say why judgment should not be pronounced. Because no sufficient cause to the contrary was shown or appeared to a court, the court adjudged the defendant guilty as changed and convicted and ordered that. The defendant is needly committee to the cause dyed the Attentity General or his authorized representative for approximent for a period of
	9 years on count 1 and 1 year on count 3 to run
SENTENCE	concurrently, Stay of execution of sentence granted
PROBATION	pending appeal.

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ment doorn't make any difference.

SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF PROBATION FILED-IN CLERK'S OFFICE U. S DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y.

★ SEP 17 1976

JIME A M.

ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS OF PROBATION

In addition to the specific polarities approach the continuous process of the bereby ordered that the general conditions of probation set out on the first assert the pelice of a read to period of probation, and at the pelice of a read to period of probation, and at the period of probation, and at the period of probation, and at the period of the period of the period of probation, and at the period of probation and at the period of probation period of the period of the period of probation and revoke probation is a violation occurrence during the probation period.

The court of ters commit acrit to the castody of the Attorney General and recommends,

It is ordered that the Clerk deliver a certified copy of this judgment and commitment to the U.S. Marson or other qualified officer

RECOMMEN DATION

SIGNED BY

Les District Judge

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1	PRE-TRIAL HU. RING
2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
3	EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
4	х
5	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, :
6	Plaintiff, :
7	-against- : 76-CR-133
8	MAXIMO JIMINEZ and JAMES :
9	MALONE, Defendants.:
10	x
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12	United States Courthouse Brooklyn, New York
13	May 21, 1976 10:00 o'clock a.m.
14	
15	
16	Before:
17	EONORABLE JACK B. WEINSTEIN, U.S.D.J.
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21	X ament
22	East with the or act.
23	
94	DANIEL D. SIMON OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

A

Appearances:

DAVID G. TRAGER
United States Attorney
Eastern District of New York

BY: PETER R. SCHLAM
Assistant United States Attorney

-

MICHAEL WARSHOR, ESQ.
Attorney for defendant Maximo Jiminez

HARVEY GREENBERG, ESQ.
Attorney for defendant James Malone

2-

MR. SCHLAM: Good morning, your Honor.

THE COURT: I think it probably would be easier if we were to bring the government attorney over here and defense counsel next to their respective clients.

MR. WARSHOR: Do you mind at this time if they are next to each other at the pretrial hearings?

THE COURT: I would rather that you be next to your client.

All right. We are here for what purpose?

MR. WARSHOR: Well, your Honor, as you well know I am participating in this trial as of two or three days, and I am relying on some of the material that I have from the prior attorney and from conferences with co-counsel.

I understand that there is an issue and a motion was made relative to speedy trial. I suppose that ought to be discussed and reasoned out at this time.

THE COURT: Are you suggesting that you are not prepared to try the case?

are preliminary matters that are before this court at this time. There are certain issues that I wish to raise, but I suppose that we can hold that in abeyance until w decide - -

that you want to take up?

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1R. WARSHOR: I suppose it would be the speedy trial concern.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. WARSHOR: Mr. Jacobs had submitted a memorandum to the court requiring or requesting a hearing on the matter.

And as I understand the facts - -

THE COURT: Well, the hearing will now start. I will give you a hearing.

NR. WARSHOR: Well, now, it is a question of the burden of going forward at this particular time. Let me make a presentation to your Honor so you can determine whether or not there would be a necessity to perpetuate the testimony in this matter.

The incidents in the indictment commence from 1969 to 1971 through the entire year of 1971.

It is the contention of the defendants that the government had or should have had the requisite knowledge of the alleged improprieties, and delay the prosecution herein for an unreasonable period of time so it has put the defendants at a distinct disadvantage.

Firstly we allege that the delay is somewhat purposeful, and secondly that there has been actually prejudice which has inured to the detriment of the accused.

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I am aware of the Marron case. I am aware of the two recent cases from the Second Circuit which really do not take a definitive position as to whether we have to establish or it must be established to the court's satisfaction that there is a purposeful delay as well as prejudice.

Butera and Horrigan who are members of the SIU and who we have reason to believe were a part of the team of police officers during this period of time, and we have reason to believe that the testimony during the course of the trial would indicate conversations, actions, conduct, etcetera, by and between Horrigan and Butera. That by innuends and by inference and by direct application of certain of our laws would be attributable to the accused.

Both these two individuals are now deceased.

believe the notice of motion of Mr. Jacobs and his accompanying affidavit recited the exact dates when the two individuals died.

problems of not being able to adequately recall dates, times, places and incidents during this hiatus of time obviously presents itself as a serious problem to the accused.

Insofar as I am led to believe in 1972 one witness

and was working for the authorities, if I am accurate,
Special Prosecutor Maurice Najari. And that at least at
that time and probably sometime before there was an
investigation into the conduct of the defendant Jiminez,
the allegation obviously being corrupt activities by the
accused as a police officer. And I have reason to believe
that there was a tape recording made of the conversation
by and between the defendant Jiminez and this one Armond.

I have further reason to believe that the government in this instance had available to it most if not all of the information, the witnesses, etcetera, that may well be produced during the course of the trial here.

THE COURT: When?

MR. WARSHOR: Well, I know that Captain Daniel
Tange, who I believe is a prospective witness for the
government, back in 1972 had taken a step toward
cooperating with the government directly.

I have mentioned to you the Armond situation early in 1972.

We have an indictment here I believe that was founded I believe on the 20th - - Mr. Greenberg - - the 20th of February 1976, if I am correct.

I further believe that the government had knowledge that there was a state case that was pending

against Maximo Jiminez for a considerable period of time.

And I trink it is more than mere coincidence that the indictment followed February of 1976 when the trial in the State case occurred, and terminated in mid-February, if I am accurate, 1976.

And the allegation or position that we are taking is that there was a delay here by the government unwarranted and for an unreasonable period of time, your Honor, putting us at a distinct disadvantage. And in fact giving the government a decided advantage vis-a-vis the result of the State conviction.

It so happens that he was convicted after trial in the State Court.

And the charges in the State Court were similar, if not identical background - - the nomenclature of the client being somewhat different - - but no difference in substance.

THE COURT: Well, has he been sentenced?

I understand your Honor's feeling about whether a sentence has been imposed, and whether it constitutes a final judgment or not. I have had the benefit of reading some of your works on that matter and I must anticipate that your rulings would be consonant to your thoughts as expressed in your commentaries.

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between the imposition of bringing a jury verdict to a technical finality, and that the jury verdict per se constitutes the conviction, and I am not - -

THE COURT: I am just interested in what the sentence is. If there is a long sentence what is the purpose of trying him again in the Federal Court?

MR. WARSHOR: Judge, that brings in the Ninth
Amendment - -

THE COURT: But it is a matter of discretion.

MR. WARSHOR: Now you have selective prosecution also. So what's the purpose of this trial if they knew of the alleged activity?

prosecution argument in these SIU cases does not seem to me to have much weight. We have tried a whole series of them. I have a jury out now in a conspiracy involving three former SIU members. I tried another three-person conspiracy which resulted in the conviction sometime ago. I tried one before that resulting in an acquittal. And I have taken a number of guilty pleas - -

MR. WARSHOR: I might direct myself, your Honor THE COURT: - - There is no selective process

prosecution argument of any substance in this court.

MR. WARSHOR: Might I suggest I am not directing

24a the selective prosecution argument to the SIU circumstances but to the fact that once the government is well 3 aware that the individual has been convicted in the State 4 Court for the very similar or identical type of crime, 5 even recognizing the dual-sovereignty concepts, there is 6 no reason to prosecute him here. It is a discretionary 7 matter. This is not a selective prosecution defense. are you presenting as your first motion laches or 8 9 what? What is it? Speedy trial? MR. WARSHOR: Yes, pre-indictment delay.

THE COURT: Pre-indictment delay.

MR. GREENBERG: I would like to add something,
your Honor - -

THE COURT: Are you joining in this motion?

MR. GREENBERG: Yes. I have joined in the motion.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GREENBERG: I would just like to add this,
your Honor, outside of the conspiracy count, it is a twocount - - two substantive-count indictment and the two
overt acts and that the conspiracy of the two substantive
counts - - two substantive counts are the two overt acts
in the conspiracy count.

Now, your Honor, as part of the 3500 material that I have received, I have received a search warrant and affidavit by Dominick Butera, that is the deceased

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count of the indictment. And I am sure it was not given to me just for me to have it in my file. I am sure that there is going to be some representation that this Butera warrant with reference to Quinones had something to do with the alleged taking of the money from Quinones. And Butera of course is named as a co-conspirator in this particular case in the conspiracy count.

It seems to me, your Honor, that five years later to the day - - and I will get to that as part of my Statute of Limitations in that count as I have a motion on that, but it seems to me that five years later to the date to indict an individual and charge him with conspiracy and the substantive count, and then use as part of your proof an affidavit of a police officer who you know is deceased, and who you knew was deceased, and who had died sometime long prior to the indictment - - and we have the date of death here someplace unverified - - but I just would assume - -

MR. SCHLAM: September 1975.

MR. GREENBERG: September of 1975. And it seems to me, your Honor, to put the defendant at a complete distinct disadvantage. Judge, in presenting any kind of defense: as far as Butera who was allegedly a co-conspirator, as far as his affidavit and search warrant,

which may or my not form the basis, or whether the government is going to allege that it is false, or that there was something wrong with it, or just use as a ruse to shake down this individual Quinones. And the government clearly notes that Butera is no longer available; that he is dead. And you know, it seems to me to just be completely unfair to present - - if that is the case - - and I am not saying it is the government's case, but if it is the government's case everything of the dead man is going to be their case. And then they are going to say - - someone will come in and say Butera and Jiminez and Malone were on the same unit in the SIU, or whatever Butera did, and you know it is Jiminez and Malone, and, your Honor, you just sat through one and you well know the danger of such a kind of approach in this type of case - -

THE COURT: What does the government have to say?

IR. SCHLAM: Well, your Honor, the government's

position is that when the investigation was completed

the ind stment was returned. Obviously with respect to

an individual who is deceased I just don't understand

the point with respect to that, but - -

THE COURT: Well, who are your main witnesses in this case?

MR. SCHLAM: Well, the main witnesses, your Honor,

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as far as police officers are concerned are Tange and Fascinella who testified in the King case.

SHE COURT: When did Fascinella start to turn state's evidence?

MR. SCHLAM: I think it was July of 1975, your

THE COURT: Tange?

MR. SCHLAM: Tange cooperated with Najari I think in 1972 - - as early as 1972.

THE COURT: That is why he got the biggest pension. He started to cooperate first.

MR. SCHLAM: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: If it's the same grand jury that handed down these indictments that handed them down in the King case.

NR. SCHLAM: I believe that's correct, your Honor.

I didn't present this case to the grand jury, but I
believe that's correct.

HE COURT: Who presented this one?

.. R. SCHLAM: Mr. Puccio.

THE COURT: Well, I think I'll reserve decision on this until after the trial. You can present evidence after the trial. Much of it will be a duplicate of what comes in at the time of the trial. I see no point in trying a case twice.

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What's your next motion?

R. GREENBERG: Your Honor, I have a motion, and this motion is limited to the second count of the indictment which happens to be the Jiminez count again.

Your Honor, the date of the incident with Jiminez is reputed to be February 20, 1971.

THE COURT: The indictment came down when?

MR. GREENBERG: February 20, 1976.

THE COURT: So that the statute is satisfied.

MR. GREENBERG: Well, the cases that I have cited in my notice of motion, the Wellman case and the Klein case, seem to indicate, and I have both cases photostated -- seem to indicate that that day is the day that it is finished.

THE COURT: The next day, I would think, the 21st.
What does the government have to say?

NR. SCHLAM: Your Honor, the government says that five years from February 20th, 1971 is February 20th, 1976.

THE COURT: Do you have any cases?

Mx. SCHLAM: No, I haven't got a case on it.

THE COURT: Well, brief it.

Decision reserved.

MR. WARSHOR: Your Honor, for your edification the second overt act or the first overt act in the conspiracy is also Pebruary 20th.

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THE COURT: That doesn't make any difference.

MR. WARSHOR: Well, from the standpoint of recognizing that this court's position so far as what overt acts must be established for the jury to return a verdict of guilty - -

THE COURT: Do you mean under the Statute of Limitations on Count One?

MR. WARSHOR: That is right.

this last case I charged the jury that the overt act charged had to take place within five years. But I don't believe that that's the law. I think any overt act is sufficient as long as the conspirate, continues. Brief it. You will have time until the charge to brief it because I am not going to grant the motion now.

MR. WARSHOR: Your Honor, just on that for a second, I realize there are cases that allow the court to charge that any overt act that is produced if established beyond a reasonable dov! . can be taken into consideration in furtherance of the conspiracy. Yet we do have the criminal procedure which says that it should be the overt act alleged in the indictment.

Now listening to your charge here - -

THE COURT: That's the way I charged here but that was bocause the government didn't object to it. In any

event there is no basis for deciding it now. I can 1 decide it when I charge. You will have to thoroughly 2 brief it. You know what the issue is. There is no 3 basis for the dismissal because the second overt act took 4 place long after the statute, March - -5 MR. WARSHOR: Well, what about your position 6 7

relative to the second count? That could make quite a difference.

THE COURT: Brief it.

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As of now based on the general rules with respect to measuring time, to start the measuring on the 21st day, five years from the 20th is the 20th.

MR. WARSHOR: Can we get to the other aspects? THE COURT: But brief it. If you have anything on it I will be delighted to hear it. Maybe the Statute of Limitations on this might be different from all other statutes of limitation possibly. I just don't know enough about it. I never had the issue before.

> MR. WARSHOR: May we go to the other aspects? THE COURT: We will have to break in five minutes.

MR. WARSHOR: Let me see what I can do in five minutes.

MR. SCHLAM: You take Count Four and I will take One.

MR. WARSHOR: Go . head. Be my guest.

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SUMBAM: Go ahead. Finish up. Then I will finish to at the end.

MARSHOR: The real knub of the case, as I said, is the State conviction. It is not only a problem but I think it is the reason we are here. But be it as it may, I would ask for a ruling at this time before we start the trial as to whether or not this court is going to allow the government on its direct case-in-chief to introduce evidence of the prior State conviction.

THE COURT: How could I? It is structly hearsay. On what theory could the government possibly do that? MR. WARSHOR: I am not about to set forth reasons of how or why.

THE COURT: Are you offering it on direct? MR. SCHLAM: We do not intend to offer on the direct case the conviction.

MR. WARSHOR: Fine, Judge. I have absolutely nothing further to argue on the point any longer.

Now let's get to the problem that involves the Palumbe - type - -

THE COURT: If he testifies do you want an advance ruling?

MR. WARSHOR: Here is the problem that we have - -THE COURT: If there is no sentence I won't see it as a conviction.

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MR. WARSHOR: Oka,. That problem is solved. So that for the impeachment - -

The law in California is differed but I do not agree with the California law.

MR. WARSHOR: So if he is not sentenced and he is testifying - -

THE COURT: He is not convicted.

MR. WARSHOR: Last but not least are the words that really are not coterminous, double jeopardy, collateral estoppel, res adjudicata - -

THE COURT: You had better brief it thoroughly.

I can't answer that question. It is a complicated question. I don't know anything about the State trial.

I don't know enough about the law. The law in this area is extremely complex. Give me a full brief on it.

MR. WARSHOR: Have a nice weekend, Judge.

But I can't do these things off the top of my head.

IR. WARSHOR: I am prepared to submit cases to you.

I mean at this point, obviously.

THE COURT: Not only the cases but the factual basis and the whole business. It is impossible for me to answer any question like that.

N . SCHLAM: Your Honor, the indictment charges

that the object of the conspiracy was to steal money.

THE COURT: Well, where does it say that?

MR. SCHLAM: Deprivation of property, currency, is referred to.

Just a momen :. In Paragraph Two for example:

perverted and subordinated to the end of obtaining sums of money for its members including the defendants . . .

And I believe in Paragraph Five, your Honor:

"... It was part of said onspiracy that the defendants and co-conspirators willfully, knowingly and unlawfully used their authority as police officers..." etcetera "... to obtain money by theft, extortion and other unlawful means ... "

THE COURT: Well, did the grand jury have before it evidence of stealing narcotics?

MR. SCHLAM: I believe not, your Honor.

part of that without a superseding indictment unless the derendents will agree because based on that language, which is much more precise than the language in King — the King language was ambiguous. It said "property" and I limited it for reasons of prejudice. If the grand jury has nothing before it but money and no narcotics, then I assume that is what they meant, money and not

narcotics.

allow it in in the nature of a similar act.

THE COURT: No, unless the defendants would agree.

It is just too prejudicial.

MR. SCHLAM: Well then I am going to have to ask either that the defense consent to this or that I am going to have to supersede the indictment.

THE COURT: I think you had better get a superseding indictment because this business of proof of stealing
narcotics for resale is a very serious kind of allegation.

What is the defendants' view on this?

MR. WARSHOR: Your Honor, on behalf of the accused Jiminez, we are not going to consent. And if and when they do attempt to get a superseding indictment then we will argue that point. But it just kind of reaches a particular stage where on the eve of trial of this indictment just to satisfy the possible proof that they have, to get a superseding indictment, when you have got the Statute of Limitations, and when you have got speedy trial issues, I would hope that it has to stop sometime somewhere.

THE COURT: Well, the reason the government has this brought to its attention is because of my ruling in the King case.

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MR. WARSHOR: That is eight weeks old, Judge. That is eight weeks old.

THE COURT: But the rulings came rather late in the game. They weren't sure that it was going to be kept out until the last week.

Well, what's going to be the effect of the superseding indictment with respect to the Statute of Limitations?

MR. SCHLAM: Well, your Honor, I think - - I really don't know what the effect will be. I will have to study it and see whether the saving provision might - I don't even know if that - -

MR. WARSHOR: I have researched that aspect. I say from the top of my head that there is no tolling of the statute by the filing of the one instrument.

THE COURT: You had better brief the point. I may be wrong on the narcotics problem. But it does seem to me if you tell me there is nothing about narcotics stealing in the - - you have gone through the grand jury?

MR. SCHLAM: Yes. Your Honor, the only thing I would say is that under the ordinary principles of similar acts, this seems to be very similar.

THE COURT: It is a different thing to shake down money or to shake down narcotics and sell it - -

MR. SCHLAM: Well, narcotics are money in effect.

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of shaking down money from a narcotics dealer and will never forgive him for shaking down narcotics and selling it.

MR. SCHLAM: This is going to be - -

THE COURT: I think you had better consider the matter from that point. I am not making the final decision. But I would like a brief. I would like some full preliminary discussion on it. I will see you Tuesday. That will give you the weekend. Monday I will be trying the King case. I do not think they are coming in. I will have to be away part of Monday morning.

MR. SCHLAM: So basically, your Honor, if necessary, we may have to supersede the indictment.

THE COURT: Well, you had better consider it. It is a very complicated decision. I will see you all on Tuesday.

Do you want to consider this case as started?

MR. WARSHOR: Yes, please.

Your Honor, with respect to superseding indictments, do you have any particular views on Costello against the United States?

THE COURT: Yes, I have views on it.

MR. WARSHOR: To send in an agent five years
later to testify to everything that was once before this

grand jury - -

THE COURT: Well, I have written on Costello but MR. WARSHOR: I think, if I am correct, there was
a reversal - -

THE COURT: No. It was one of the few cases I wasn't reversed on, that opinion.

But superseding indictments present special kinds of problems. And it is a big problem for the government.

MR. GREENBERG: Judge, can I suggest 11:00 o'clock on Tuesday?

THE COURT: The calendar is completely fouled up because of the King case which has been on for so long.

MR. WARSHOR: I couldn't believe I am back in this case and you are on trial in the King case.

THE COURT: What do you mean?

MR. WARSHOR: You just didn't want to give us that two-week adjournment eight weeks ago.

THE COURT: Well, you got it.

Appearances

United States Attorney
for the Lastern District of Tew York

Assistant U.S. Attorney

MICHAEL WASHOR, ESO. | Attorney for Defendant agic Jimenez

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THE COURT: Have you had an opportunity to read the pre-sentence record and discuss it with your defendant?

a few objections.

I take objection to several of the objections in the report, the problems of the objections and bringing it to the Court's attention is somewhat like telling the Court to pay no attention to certain aspects, yet in order to do that will cause to be specific a while it directly to your attention.

statements in the report relative to the defendant being involved in the distribution of narcotics.

Without minimizing the prese t charges, might I suggest the statement and, if I'm acculate from my notes, that was not produced, because the United States Attorney's office felt there was a lack of credibility, recelling the witnesses that brought forth the statements, so, in one vein while I brought it to your attention I am asking you not to take it into consideration.

There is no proof of that in whatever information was conveyed, caused it to be incorporated in the report quite apparently.

THE COURT: I wouldn't consider any evidence

which was before me at the crial. There was some 2 evid noe suggesting that he held out some narcotics 3 before me at the trial, if I recall, I will not consider anything else than what was actually introduced. 5 ". WASHOR: I dor't have to allude to that 6 aspect of the report. 7 I suggest to your Honor, there is conspicuously 8 absent certain background material of the accused, more 9 particularly, the great pains were taken to detail the 10 impropriety, it seems that the scale on which the 11 Court is supposed to rate the equities laft out the entire background within the Police Department, left 12 13 out the entire area of the man's life. 14 THE COURT: He testified, as I recall, and as I recall you very ably eligited much of this good back-15 cround, including all of his good works on the police 16 force, there weren't any questions when he was an 17 18 armo of cor he was a very good cop. 19 Mr. WARROW: There are areas of valor and courage, a little bir above and Levond which are not within the 20 21 purview of the report. The COURT: ne was able, a trave policeman, and 22 he did a lot of very fine things. As I recall, there 23 was a war record, also very favorable war record and 24 a goo family record. except for the fact that we have 25

have here, which is very disturbing, he would have been an estimable member of the community. And unen once again there is reference to the defendant, if I may quote the language, "snorting cocaine in the capacity of an undercover police officer."

I wouldn't assume that, I wouldn't assume that he took drugs.

IR. WASHOR: Suffice it then to say you have indicated you are going to consider favorable inspection as well as those matters which you have in your recollection, was brought forth during the trial and the allegations in the report, I think it's proper preference and perspective, am I accurate?

THE COURT: That is correct, since the case was fully tried I'm going to rely much more on the record of the trial than on anything in this report.

attention. It's a legal corcept, you can well understand as being privy, that is, myself, to this Court's sentencing of other members of the Special Investigating Unit, I from that point more so than the verdict of the jury have been very much perturbed, I say this candidly to the Court so you understand the reason for my presentation. Of course, when a member of the advocacy system finds he is up against a different

Honor's attitude for the imposition of serious sentences in similar, but anything but like identical circumstance, it has caused me to almost in a split sense go beyond the call of the representation and seek out a legal concept that would provide room for your Honor to exercise your discretion and be more lenient under circumstances as we now have, notwithstanding the nomenclature of the crimes charged, the defendant was convicted more particularly of involving timself with a gentleman by the name of Bolen, another person by the name of Arnic, wherein these people were in possession of a good deal of money, whether it was eight thousand or ten thousand dollars, I don't remember the exact amount, frankly.

As a result of which they were taken down to the station house and I don't think there is any other way to approach the analysis of the facts, other than to say there were negotiations so that the officer could wind up with monies that were illegal. There were disputes to the amounts, how much should be given, how much should not be given, whose money it was, but full-scale negotiations obviously on an unsophisticated level. You have got the bribery --

THE COURT: I don't think they're unsophisticated,

think they're highly sophisticated.

MR. WASHOR: I am not talking about negotiations between two lawyers to settle the case.

THE COURT: C-r-u-d-e, crude.

MR. MASHOR: Judge, you see the word you are using I suggest is misapplied, but that, of course, is difference of opinion.

THE COURT: That is my interpretation of the evidence.

MR. WASHOR: What I am suggesting to your Honor, that this is a crime that involves concerted actions, concerted between the person Bolen and Armin.

THE COURT: These fellows were crokks, the lowest scum of society, and this defendant cooperated.

Warton's rule, I am now bringing to the Court's attention and asking your Honor why you cannot change the substantive application of the verdict at this stage to consider at least from the point of sentence that there should be a merger between the conspiracy charge as well as the substantive charge here.

The concerted action on the underlying facts as a result of which I suggest that the conspiracy charge and substantive charge should merge, they are not really separate and distinct.

THE COURT: I don't agree with that at all.

MR. WASHOR: Now, your Honor, regarding the defendant, Max Jimenez --

THE COURT: I don't think the evidence supports that.

MR. WASHOR: Regarding the imposition of sentence, what has to be done and what should be done.

I have to speak my peace to the Court on behalf of the accused, one, because I am obligated, two, because I am concerned. I know you have to impose a sentence, a jail sentence, and as you have indicated, as a deterrant problem we have here, that has been accomplished already. Not merely because I say so, but because it's a fact.

the past. It would seem ludicrous in this day and age with the news media knowing what goes on in the court rooms, and the sophisticated approach of the people that read the media, more particularly other members of the Police Department, to believe that what has happened in the last handful of years, three, four, five years is not a deterrant. I say to you honestly, Judge Weinstein, if it has not acted as a deterrant already, you're almost talking to a brick wall when you address the public in the way of severe sentences,

because if they haven't learned by now, they never will.

So, the imposition, he is last on the list, the last

of the Indians.

THE COURT: He is not the last, but I think they have a few more on file, don't you?

MR. SCHLAM: I can think of one offhand, your Monor.

THE COURT: They may not get them for these crimes, but they have on fact problems and others.

MR. WASHOR: When I say the last, I don't mean literally the categorical last, I mean the last of the standpoints of the investigative processing. It's at the tail end would be a better way of defining it to the Court. I suppose that seems to be the most important factor to your Honor, because you have demorstrated compassion, and understanding, of how this affects the individual's family, the children.

indicate that sometimes it would be so much nicer if you could obtain acquittals and make it easier, not just for the Court but for all the others that have to pay the most serious consequences of long incarceration, that is the frustrating conflict I am dealing with here. Instructing your Honor, I say that sincerely, I have difficulty understanding why the Court

does not realize that long jail sentences do not really accomplish what you have in mind, the deterrant to others.

You see, we have a situation with Jimenez where we do have good on one side of the scale, and we have the kind of good on one side of the scale which is left, toed its mark. The number of arrests, or as you categorize it, when he was good he was very, very good and when he was bad apparently he was very bad. The point is weighing it, you can't disregard completely what he has done to bring about some good deeds. Many good deeds. Members of the Police Department are being killed by those on the outside that really just snub their noses and pay little if any attention whatsoever to law enforcement.

We do have an individual before you that has demonstrated through actions, not words, which very ofter are categorized as cheap, he has crawled on his belly, he has been wounded, he refused to follow orders of a brother officer who was wounded, he did not abandon his duty, he did not dishonor the badge, or the others, when he was ready, willing and able to have himself killed, and how much closer rhetorically can a person get in this world to actual death than being wounded.

You're familiar with the report, you're familiar

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with the background of the particular case that I am referring to. You know I am sure that this man has infiltrated during the good years as a cop to the most difficult concepts of society, the militant society, those that go much against our government, refers to those citizens that merely violate the law because of greed.

I have spent a lot of time with Max Jimenez prior to being engaged as his Counsel. I have spent time with him when he was tried on the State case, I spent time prior to that. I knew Jimenez prior to that, also.

I can suggest that there have been many discussions relative to attitude, more important, relevant to justification and rationalization which most people seem to do when they have a problem, and probably the one phrase that I can bring to your attention stated to me this very morning in my office by Jimenez, and it sums it up pretty well as to what makes him run. And he sais in no uncertain words to me, if he had to do it all over again he would not be charged with a crime, and I know what he meant by that.

He didn't mean he would not get caught, he meant he would not have let the peer pressure, the greed, the reason that people do wrong things, the overpower, the

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good he had done, and I suppose this is the kind of plea on sentences where your Honor realizes that also, at the point of trauma there seems to be some sign of contrition, but, Judge, suppose I just suggest to you that it's never too late for an individual to recognize the error of his ways. And it's never too late, hopefully, for someone to hope to rehabilitate themselves.

And, I ask you to weigh the equities.

(continued on next page)

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in articipatio, that the Court is going to pin a medal on him, nor do I expect it to give him a minor jail sentence. What he has suffered to this point, even with a lenient sentence, will leave a mark that remains with him, his wife and children, for the remainder of his life, but it's not your fault, or the Prosectuion's fault. The worst scar a man must bear is the one he has caused to be borne on his body and the ones he has loved. He has got the intellectual ability to understand that.

Too much time, too long a time with the hope that it will act as a deterrant will do more to damage the individual, and I do suggest the ends do not justify the means. I thought so myself at one time as I was crowing up, and I ask you to take consideration for the means.

must be imposed of jail, but in so doing, Judge, we have got such wide latitude. Judge Weinstein, there are many others that are interested in the outcome of this case, those that are fearful that you could impose one, six, seven, ten, eleven years, those that don't know if he's going to get a light sentence or not, those who are going to use this as a deterrant and those

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going to use the sentence imposed by you of the indication that there is mercy within the confines of a sentence, this is not taking you as a judge, per se, I have reason to believe that is brought to my attention, there are several letters written to the Court.

defendant's wife, which I can under outh, as he can, doesn't even know the contents of very much of our objections.

letters show that this defendant has established rural roots in the community, many people that respect him and it shows that he has done many good things, there is no question about it. A person that is all bad doesn't get this lind of support, there's obviously people that love him and will be badly nort if he goes to jail.

the fount of their love, se're not unwindful for that, we're not asking this Court to suspend sentence, it would be unrealistic. We're asking not to impose on the defendant such a severe sentence that the consequences put him in a position where he has no alternative when he homes out and does irreperable harm and damage.

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can reasonably anticipate is a reoccurring event within the confines of the City of New York, or within the Police Department. I would hope not, just as a citizen, not only as an advocate.

To think what has been done un to this point is tore than a lesson to those whose inclinations lead down the road of improprieties. And I am asking not only on behalf of his children, but on behalf of the problem brought in here. We has overcome an awful lot. We has no choice but to overcome whatever sentence you dole out, don't make it so insurmountable it serves no purpose, Judge Meinstein, other than a whipping, and I mulmit to you, self-flaggelation is worse than being whipped by any mind and his experience, I ask you to try to be applied as you can.

situation in. You have deen convicted by a jury, so you have a right to arread. If you can't afford an attorney, the Government will pay for the attorney and whatever other expenses are required.

you in this area? I have explained to an Jimenez and I am oblicated under the law to represent him. I am going to do so because without remuneration --



53a 16 1 THE COURT: You are o.. title. Aren't you the 2 Second Circuit panel? 3 MR. WASHOR: Not on the assignment aspect. 4 THE COURT: Hc did you get on on a situation 5 like that? I think it seems senseless under the 6 present conditions for you to serve on an appeal. 7 MR. WASHOR: I say to you, most candidly Judge, 8 really, finance is not the only thing that dictates 9 provisions. 10 THE COURT: You do what you wish. 11 MR. WASHOR: I do request aid financially from the standpoint of the ordering of the minutes, et 12 13 cetera. THE COURT: Didn't we have copy? 14 15 MR. SCHLAM: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Having it and having it available 16 17 for us to use. We'll issue you any order you need. If you 18 can't arrange to get an order, I will submit an order 19 of lack of funds and I will give it to you. 20 I will be happy to give to you anything I can 21 to that. Anything else on that matter; you want to 22 23 add anything? THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. At this point I am 24 willing to accept the Court's statement that they would

consider both aspects of the coir.

recommend, because you do have a good record, you come from difficult hap ground, you pulled yourself up, done good, done a lot of good, made a good record for yourself. You're even working now, you're the kind of person we want in our society.

you to rehabilitation or incapacitation or anything like that. By problem is that we have an order here, pattern of crimes, and we have to have a pattern of sentences that makes some sense. The pattern has generally been that those who have stood trial and not cooperated have get eight years. Those who have gooperated at the trial, or before trial, have received consideration, sometimes I believe that consideration is much too great. Che of the key culprits here, a number of key culprits, is giving hard attention to the others that are back on the force, haven't been punished at all.

That is an unfortunate aspect I have nothing to do with. In your case we have a conviction. You did testify before the jury. In my opinion you lied, the jury believed you lied. To, if all the cases were then tried on any scale, you come in with the possibility

of the highest sentence, but if I am going to be consistent at all with the pattern I set down. I understand it's harsh. When we're dealing with appearance we're dealing with that pattern that I know I am going to hurt you and your family. That I am doing it for other sentences, count one, nine years, count three, one year to run concurrent.

In other cases where there has been assignment of cooperation I have reduced the sentence. Unfortunately, this defendant is in a position where he says he is at the end of the line. On the other hand, if there is any sign of cooperation to the extent of cooperation is possible, I will consider it as I have in the other cases and consider a reduction, motion for reduction can be made within a hundred twenty days after mandate comes down.

MR. WASHOR: Your Honor, question of appeal, it's seen indicated to you about our appeal. I suppose we're up to the point whether your Honor would consider bail sending appeal.

THE COURT: I'll put him on bail pending appeal, it's a substantial case and a case tried as hard as this over some days there is definitely errors in the record, there is never a perfect record particularly in a case like this. So, if the Appellate Court wants

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to reverse, there is reason to reverse in the case.

I think you ought to be out on bail pending appeal, any objection?

MR. SCHLAM: No objection.

THE COURT: I am not saying there are errors,

I am not inviting the importance of appeals to reverse,

I am maying there is a chance of reversal.

MR. WASHOR: May I allude to something?

You have indicated that there has to be a pattern, whether I agree or disagree at this point, I must respect your opinion.

THE COURT: I am not sentencing on the basis of the individual anymore for deterrance, he is being sacrificed, in a way, for the good of society. I don't like it, it's a terrible position because it's put in here. It's a kind of a blackmail situation where we sentence and threaten high sentences in order to induce cooperation, the Court and Prosecutor and the criminal elements are all in cahoots. They're all part of the defense Counsel, unfortunately we're all engaged in a criminal, semi'criminal activity. I don't like it, it's the situation. It's the only way we can get cooperation in these cases is the threat of high sentences.

The Court is paid off to become a party of this

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conspiracy, chase down to get them to court and reducing sentences and taking pleas.

You understand it, I understand it, I am not proud of my activity, but that is what happens. I would have no objection at all to the Court of Appeals reversire, and require the re-sentence on the grounds that this case -- T'll make a point but I have to exercise discretion appropriately -- we can get some expedience on it, fine. It's the position of the Court, I try to have a nattern, somebody's cooperated early and the Government has agreed on exposition without jail, and they have in some cases, I follow that. Some cases I think are accessible with time. Where they pleaded without such arraignment, they get jail, a rather light jail. When they haven't cooperated, they det heavy jail terms. When they cooperated subsequently, I reduce it, but not as much as at the cutset.

One case I gave the man ten year term, there were actually, actually cooperated. Jimenez at the time this is a very different area. If we can get some cuidance from the Court of Appeals, and if I am wrong in Lecoming a party of this pattern of compelling people to cooperate, I would like to know and that I am not groud of the position.

Ta .

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MR. WASHOR: It's just two aspects. Firstly, if my recollection is correct, several of the other sentences imposed were only using this on a non-prosecutions area, since you said that is the basis of the imposition of sentence, they received a sentence of five years and one year to run consecutively.

THECOURT: Those are the maximum, as I recall.

12. SCHLAMI. The maximum on a civil right
conspiracy is ten years.

THE COURT: I forcet the situation.

Mr. Washor refers to, some of the defendants were not charged in the same count.

difficult, but I have generally followed these cases and you can find distinctions and there are all kinds of special corpusations involved. But, the general pattern has seen a plea early with cooperation, very light sentence. A plea without cooperation, substantial sentence. A trial without cooperation, a very substantial sentence. A subsequent cooperation, a reduction of pentence. I think that is the general pattern. Your man comes in without any cooperation, tried by jury, found quilty, I very serious aspect, testition and lied. Le comes in at the very top.

MR. WASHOR: You see the problem I have. I have spent really so many years with reading your writings where you really are the backbone to the Fifth Amendment, the right to remain silent. You are -

THE COURT: I agree. He has got a right to ferain silent, but if he comes in and he is the Government's undercover, other crooks and thieves, he's entitled to consideration.

I couldn't hold it against him that he was silent. I don't hold against him he was convicted, went to trial, whether he testified. But I am not going to ignore the fact that he did not cooperate.

MR. WASHOR: There is nobody left.

THE COURT: Let him tell them something. You come in and tell me what they told him and I will consert. I don't need the Government to tell me they're satisfied with his cooperation.

MR. WASHOR: We're really confronted with a unique problem, most unique. Unique in the sense a complete catharsis of which a defendent might be caused to go through would be just a repetition of all the trials that transpired here.

THE COURT: That isn't so.

MR. WASHOR: There is no evidence to the contrary, that is our problem.

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THE COURT: You still haven't told us what he knows about the situation.

MR. WASHOR: Your Honor, what bail would the Court impose?

THE COURT: What is the present situation; out on his own recognizance?

MR. WASHOR: I couldn't believe he is going to run away, he is a family man, you have got a job now, haven't you?

THE DEPENDANT: Two jobs.

THE COURT: Responsible citizen?

MR. WASHOR: I am not accusing you of joining yourself --

THE COURT: Get a proposal, that isn't our decision. I don't have any desire to keep this man in jail.

on the appeal. We'll file the necessary papers and with our permission I will be in contact with your office so we can make arrangements for the report.

THE COURT: Whatever I can do to assist you.

(Whereupon, at this time the Criminal Ca e
for Sentencing was concluded.)

* * *

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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
3	x
4	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :
5	-against-
6	76-CR-133
7	MAXIMO JIMINEZ and : JAMES MALONE,
8	Defendants.
	: x
9	
10	
11	United States Courthouse Brooklyn, New York
12	June 7, 1976
13	10 o'clock, A.M.
14	Before:
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16	HONORABLE JACK B. WEINSTEIN, U.S.D.J.
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19	
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21	
22	MICHAEL MIELE OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
23	OFFICIAL COOK REPORTER

DAVID G. TRAGER, ESQ.
United States Attorney
for the Eastern District of New York

BY: PETER SCHLAM, ESQ.
Assistant U. S. Attorney

MICHAEL WASHOR, ESQ. Attorney for Defendant Jiminez

HARVEY GREENBERG, ESQ. Attorney for Defendant Malone

12.

THE CLERK: Case on trial.

MR. SCHLAM: I have an application before the jury comes in. While waiting out in the hallway I noticed that Mr. Jiminez' wife was crying. I just want to ask whatever spectators are going to be present during the charge, maintain their composure. If they cannot do so, they should not sit in the courtroom at all.

MR. WASHOR: The Government brought this to my attention before you took the bench. I have admonished the family of the defendant. They assured me they can maintain their composure. There should be no problem.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

Bring in the jury.

(Jury present.)

Nice to see you all this morning. I am now going to tell you what the law is. I want you to follow my instructions. You alone have the responsibility for finding the facts and for determining guilt or innocence. I have no view as to the guilt or innocence of these defendants. Nothing that I have said or done during the course of the trial should be taken by you as indicating any such view. The rulings that I have made were determined on the basis of procedural matters

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that are of no concern to you. My sole concern now and throughout the trial has been that you decide the case fairly in accordance with the law and the evidence before you, and without sympathy or favor to any party. Everyone here is entitled to equal justice. The fact that this case was brought in the name of the Unites States does not entitled the prosecution to any benefits. The indictment is merely an accusation in writing. It is no evidence of guilt and it is entitled to no weight in your determination of the issues in this case. Each of the defendants have pleaded not guilty. That means that the Government has the burden of proving their guilt beyond a reasonable coubt as to each individually with respect to each element of each of the crimes they're accused of having committed. The burden never shifts throughout the trial. A defendant does not have to prove his innoceace. He does not have to submit any evidence at al . A defendant need not take the witness stand and you may draw no inference unfavorable to him because he does not testify.

You may not consider the fact that a defendant did not testify.

A presumption of innocence remains with a defendant throughout the trial and must not be considered

by you in your deliberations.

A reasonable doubt means a doubt sufficient to cause a prudent person to hesitate to act in the most important affairs of his or her life. A reasonable doubt may result from the evidence you heard or the failure to produce evidence.

Finding a person to be guilty of a serious crime is, of course, an important and serious occasion in your life and in the life of those before you, and you will consider the seriousness of the matter in determining whether you have a reasonable doubt.

Nevertheless, if at the end of your deliberations you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is guilty of the crime charged, then you should find him guilty of that crime. It must be established beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant acted wilfully and knowingly before he may be found guilty of a crime.

An act is wilful and knowing if it is done intentionally, deliberately, and voluntarily, with the specific intent to accomplish something the law forbids -- that is to say, with the bad purpose to disobey or disregard the law and which the defendant recognizes he can be criminally prosecuted for.

An act is not knowing if it is committed because of a mistake, carelessness, negligence, stupidity, or some other non-criminal reason.

The state of mind of these defendants will have to be determined by you based upon what you have heard and what you will see in examining the documents.

One may not however wilfully, intentionally remain ignorant of a fact important and material to his conduct, in order to escape the consequences of the criminal law.

This indictment charges three distinct counts or crimes. You must consider each of them separately as to each defendant. In other words, in effect, you are deciding six cases here.

I will first read each count to you and then after I read the count, I will explain what the law is that applies to that count. The first count is the conspiracy count. It charges that the defendants and others participated in an illegal conspiracy and reads as follows:

"Between the years 1969 to 1971 there was an investigative unit within the Narcotics Burear of the New York City Police Department, entitled, The Special Investigations unit, the SIU.

The jurisdiction of SIU was city-wide and its function was to gather evidence for the arrest and prosecution of major narcotics violators. During the aforesaid period, Maximo H. Jiminez and James H. Malone, the defendants, and Dominick Butera, now deceased and named herein as a co conspirator and not as a defendant, were members of SIU and, as such, were Police Officers acting under color of the law of the State of New York.

During the aforesaid period the legitimate

function of the SIU was perverted and subordinated to

the end of obtaining sums of money for its members,

including the defendants, through theft and extortion

from narcotics dealers and suspects who were the

subjects of their investigations. In short, the

principal purpose of investigations conducted by

members of SIU, including the defendants, was not to

convict those illegally engaged in the narcotics

trade, but to enrich the members of the SIU through

repeated violations of the Constitution of the United

States, the laws of the State of New York and the

regulations of the Police Department of the City of

New York.

The illegal activity of the various members of the SIU, including the defendants, was undertaken with

the knowledge and consent of the other members of SIU and could not have succeeded without their joint operation.

On or about and between the first day of January 1969 and the 30th day of December, 1971, both dates being approximate and inclusive, within the Eastern District of New York and elsewhere, for the purpose of carrying out the illegal SIU activities heretofore described, Maximo H. Jiminez and James H. Malone, the defendants, together with Dominick Butera and other co-conspirators known and unknown to the Grand Jury, wilfully, knowingly and unlawfully combined, conspired, confederated and agreed together and with each other to use their authority as Police Officers acting under color of the law of the State of New York to injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate citizens in the free exercise and enjoyment of their rights and privileges secured to them by the Const. tution of the United States.

It was part of said conspiracy that the defendants and their co-conspirators wilfully, knowingly and unlawfully would use their authority as police officers acting under the color of the law of the State of New York to obtain money by theft, extortion and other

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unlawin means from Ismael Quinones, John Boland and William Armond, who were citizens of the United States, thereby injuring, oppressing, threatening and incriminating them in the free exercise and enjoyment of a right and privilege secured to them by the Constitution of the United States, namely, the right not to be deprived of property without due process of law.

the defendants and their co-conspirators would conceal the existence of the conspiracy and would take steps.

do shed to prevent disclosure of their activities.

the objects thereof, the following overt acts, among others, were committed in the Eastern District of New York and elsewhere.

Jimingz and Malone, and other members of SIU divided among themselves approximately \$4,000 taken from the apartment of one Ismael Quinones in Brooklyn, New York.

Jiminez and Malone and co-conspirator Butera had a conversation with John Boland and William Armond at the 114th Precinct in Queens, New York."

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If these acts are true, this would be a violation of the United States Code, Section 241.

Now, I will tell you in a moment about overt acts, but Section 241 provides as follows:

"If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same, they shall be guilty of a felony."

There are four elements, if you analyze the statute which the Government has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.

First, the defendants must have been engaged in a conspiracy.

Second, the object of the conspiracy must have been to injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate the victim in the exercise of a right or privilege secured by the Constitution. The Constitutional right that the defendants are accused of preventing citizens from freely exercising is the right not to be deprived of property without due process of law. A conspiracy to violate this constitutional right would constitute a federal crime.

Third, the victim of the conspiracy must have been a citizen of the United States.

A person born in Puerto Rico is a citizen of the United States.

Fourth, there must have been an intent on the part of the defendant, wilfully to prevent the victim from freely exercising a right or privilege secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Now, the first element is the conspiracy element.

That required you to find two things:

First, there were two or more persons involved.

A person cannot enter into a conspiracy with himself.

Besides the two defendants on trial, it is charged

that Butera was a co-conspirator.

Second, that the two or more persons wilfully and knowingly conspired or agreed.

If you find that there was no agreement among any of the co-conspirators referred to in Count One, you may not find that a conspiracy existed. The first thing you have to ask yourselves is whether there was a wilful and knowing agreement.

In order to find such an agreement, it is not necessary that you find that persons charged met together and entered into an express or formal agreement, or that

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or how it was to be achieved. It is sufficient to show that they came to a mutual understanding to accomplish the unlawful act.

The evidence must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy was knowingly formed and the defendants wilfully participated in the unlawful plan with the intent to advance or further some object or purpose of the conspiracy. Here, of course, to prevent citizens from freely exercising their rights under the constitutional laws of the United States, as I will explain them in a moment.

The agreement may be inferred from the circumstances and the conduct of the parties as revealed by the evidence. More direct evidence than this is usually not available, since a conspiracy is ordinarily characterized by secrecy. Nevertheless, suspicion cannot be a substitute for evidence and mere similarity of corduct does not establish a conspiracy.

(Continued on next page.)

need not know all of the details of a conspiracy, nor all the parties to it, nor all the means by which the objects were to be accomplished. Each member of a conspiracy may perform different and separate acts. It is necessary, however, that the Government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware of the common purpose and that the defendant was a willing and knowing participant with the intent to advance the purpose of the conspiracy.

A single conspiracy over a period of almost three years is charged, not a series of individual conspiracies. You need not find that the conspiracy covered the entire three years or that it was limited to the years in question, but it must be more than a series of independent discreet conspiracies or arrangements. If there was no over-all conspiracy, but only a series of discreet conspiracies, the defendants must be acquitted.

You may find a defendant participated in a conspiracy, if the Government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that he entered the ongoing conspiracy knowing that it was a continuing conspiracy. A

defendant need not be a member of a conspiracy from its inception or to its end, solong as all the elements of the crime are proven as to him beyond a reasonable doubt.

A single act may be enough to draw a defendant within the ambit of the conspiracy, provided you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew of the conspiracy and associated himself with it, intending that it succeed.

The second element of Section 241 pertains to the object of the conspiracy. You must find that the object of the conspiracy was to injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate the victim of the conspiracy in the exercise or enjoyment of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

The right not to be deprived by state officials acting under color of state law -- and policemen are state officials for this purpose -- property or liberty, without due process of law is guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Money is property within the meaning of the Constitution. Abusing the power possessed as policemen to confiscate the money of individuals for their own use, constitutes a deprivation of property or liberty

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without due process under the Constitution.

The third necessary element of Section 241 is that the victim of the conspiracy be a citizen of the United States. The 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.

"American citizenship may be acqui red by birth or naturalization or by special act."

As I explained to you, birth in Puerto Rico is equivalent to birth within one of the United States. The Government contends that persons listed in Count 1 as victims were citizens.

The fourth and final element of Section 241, that the defendant acted wilfully with the specific intent to deprive a person named in the indictment of a constitutional right.

I have already indicated to you what wilful and knowing and voluntary and intentional is. That is essentially that there is an act done deliberately with bad purpose to disobey or disregard the law.

It is not necessary to show or prove that the

defend int was thinking in constitutional terms at the time of the incident, for a deliberate deprivation of a person's constitutional rights — here the right not to be deprived of property by a person purporting to act as a policeman. It is not necessary to show that he was thinking in those constitutional terms in order to have the specific intent to deprive a person of his constitutional rights. You may find that a defendant acted with the requisite intent, even if you find that he had no real familiarity with the constitution or with the particular constitutional rights involved, provided that you find that he wilfully and consciously did the acts which deprived the victims of their constitutional rights, knowing that the acts were illegal.

If you find that the defendant knew what he was doing and that he intended to do what he was doing, an d if you further find that what he did constituted a deprivation of a constitutional right, then you may conclude that the defendant acted with the specific intent to deprive the victims of their constitutional rights, knowing that the acts were illegal.

If you find that a defendant knew what he was

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doing and that he intended to do what he was doing and you further find that what he did constituted deprivation of a constitutional right, then you may conclude that the defendant acted with the specific intent to deprive a victim of a constitutional right.

For example, the defendant need not have been aware that a Federal statute or that the Federal Constitution was being violated if he was aware that he was wrongfully using his police authority to take property in violation of the right of a person to be brought to court to have those rights adjudicated in a lawful way is abuse of process. If a policeman deliberately uses his authority to seize money for his own use, that would be a deprivation of constitutional rights. A mere failure to comply with police or court regulations, becaus e of some mistake or neglicence would not suffice.

All people regardless of taint or degradation, so lorg as they are citizens, are within the protective embrace of Section 241. Even suspected criminality or eventual conviction and incarceration of the victims furnish no license for the destruction of quaranteed constitutional rights.

So when we say that a defendant must have the

mean in this context? Obviously, a defendant to be guilty does not have to say to himself, "Today I am going out and intend to and will violate the constitutional rights of some person." People who commit crimes such as this -- and I want to emphasize that I have no views as to the guilt or innocence of these two people -- do not usually have the Constitution in mind when they act.

What is required in this case is that a defendant have said to himself, in effect: "When a suitable opportunity presents itself, I will use my power and authority as a member of the New York City Police Department to force citizens to give me their money for my personal use, without a trial before a regular court."

Whether the defendant was convicted or acquited or his case was dismissed or for whatever reason is irrelevant in this connection.

Now, you remember I discussed overt acts.

I read them to you from the indictment. Under the applicable law an individual may not be convicted of a conspiracy if no overt act, physical acts are committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. It is not

enough that a defe indant merely agreed to do an illegal act. Something physical has to be done to begin the conspiracy. The physical thing that is done need not itself be unlawful. Of course, the conspiracy or agreement must be unlawful or there is no illegal conspiracy. Unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that one of the co-conspirators committed one of the overt acts charged, and that it was done in furtherance of the conspiracy and with knowledge that the conspiracy existed, you must acquit the defendants of the conspiracy count. The overt act must be committed after the conspiracy commences and before it ends and in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Since intent and purpose are states of mind and it is not possible to look into a man's mind to see what he was thinking, you're going to have to deduce that from the evidence you have heard and take into consideration all of the facts and circumstances as you determine them, what the state of mind of these defendants were at the times in question.

Therefore, direct proof of wilfulness or wrongful intent or knowledge is not necessary, but

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heard them.

it may be inferred from all the circumstances as you

It is not necessary that the Government prove both overt acts, just one of them suffices.

You must consider the guilt or innocence of the alleged conspirators separately. That is, you must determine separately, beyond a reasonable doubt, as to each defendant whether he knowingly and wilfully became a member of the conspiracy charged.

Mere similarity of conduct among various persons and the fact that they may have been together and discussed common interests, does not necessarily establish proof of a conspiracy.

Mere association with conspirators is not sufficient evidence of guilt of conspiracy unless there are other circumstances. You have to consider all of the circumstances together.

To summarize with respect to this first count of compiracy, you have to decide if any of these defendants named, conspired to violate the civil rights of the individuals ennumerated in Count 1. If you find such an agreement was made between these persons, then go further and determine if any one of these persons did any one or more of the overt acts

alleged to have been committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Charge of the Court

With respect to this count, even if you were
to find a defendant acted wrongfully and in violations
of state law, our state laws against theft, robbery
or bribe seeking, you may not convict unless you
find beyond a reasonable doubt that his conduct
violated the Federal status as I have explained it
to you.

Of course, an action may be in violation of both Federal and state law.

Counts 2 and 3 are known as substantive counts.

They charge that the defendant illegally took money from individuals, thus violating their constitutional rights, although the provisions are slightly different.

(continued next page)

MM/tk

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THE COURT: I will read both accounts two and three to you together because the same law applies to both of them and they are quite similar:

Count two charges that on or about the tewntieth day of February 1971, within the Eastern District of New York, Maximo H. Jimenez and James H. Malone, under cover of the law of the State of New York, wilfully, knowingly and unlawfully did take, abstract and appropriate to themselves approximately four thousand dollars from Ishmael Quinones, an inhabitant of the State of New York — thereby depriving him of a right secured and protected by the Constitution of the United States, namely the right not to be deprived of property without due process of law.

Count three charges the same thing except that it relates to the 18th day of March, 1971, and the taking of allegedly \$4,500 from John Boland and William Armond, depriving them of the right secured and protected by the United States Constituition, namely the right not to be deprived of property without due process of law.

Now, these two counts charge a violation of

Section 242 -- the first one was of 241 of Title 18

and it reads as follows: Whoever under color of any

law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom wilfully

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subjects any inhabitant of any state, territory, or district to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States shall be guilty of an offense against the United States.

each of which has to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: first, the conduct of the defendant must have deprived the victim or a right, privilege, or immunity secured or protected by the Constitution of the United States. One of the rights is that no person acting under color of law shall deprive any person of property without due process, and money, again, is property.

Second, the accused must have been acting under color of law, that is, while using or misusing power possessed by reason of the law, that is while misusing its power possessed by reason of state law.

A person does not have to be in uniform to vio-

Third, the person upon whom the alleged act was committed must have been an inhabitant of the United States, here, the State of New York, and fourth, there must have been an intent on the part of the defendant, wilfully to subject the victim of a deprivation of a right, privilege or security secured or protected by

the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 242 requires that the person deprived of the constitutional right be an inhabitant of the State, while Section 241, which was the conspiracy section required that the person be a citizen living in an apertment or even in a hotel in New York, makes a person an inhabitant, even though he is not a citizen and even though he may be intending to leave shortly.

The conspiracy must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendants conspired to act under color of law.

As I have already told you, misuse of power possessed by virtue of State law may be possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of State law, is action taken under color of law.

I have already told you about the requirement of intent with respect to conspiracy and that applies to these counts.

wrongfully in violation of the State law with respect theft or robbery or bribe receiving, you may not convict him unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that his conduct violated Federal statutes as I have explained them to you, but again they may be violations of both State and Federal statutes.

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Judge's charge

without proof that he personally did every act constituting the offense as charged, if he aided and abetted another, and this is the aiding and abetting division of the Federal statute that I am now going to explain to you.

Section 2 of Title 18 provides as follows:

Whoever commits an offense against the United States or
aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures
its commission, is punishable as a principal.

Whoever wilfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.

It is necessary in order to find aiding and abetting to find beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant wilfully associated himself in some way with the criminal venture charged and that he wilfully participated in it as something he wished to bring about.

aided or abetted you ask yourselves such questions as did he wilfully and knowingly associate himself : .th a plan to take money from the person mentioned in the count; did he participate in it as something he wished

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to bring about; did he seek by his actions to make it succeed.

If he did, then he is an aider and abettor and if he is he is treated in the same way as the principal.

count one, and this is what I am now going to tell you, relate to the so-called statute of limitations, to find that the Government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was performed while the conspiracy was still in existence and while the defendant was a member of the conspiracy and within a period of five years preceding the date of indictment.

The indictment here was handed down on February 20, 1976, therefore you must find that the conspiracy continued on or after February 20, 1971 and that some overt act occurred after that date.

In order to sustain a finding of guilt under counts two and three, the Government must also prove beyond reasonable doubt that the taking of the money described in counts two and three, if you find it took place, occurred on or after February 20, 1971, because the conspiracy that was charged is charged to

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Judge's charge

have continued until the end of 1971, and count two and count three were charged of having been committed on or after February 20, 1971; but you have to find that the statute of limitations doesn't bar this action.

So much for the law that applies to the counts in the indictment here.

Obviously the attorneys argued to you, properly, during their summations, there's a strong element of credibility in this case.

have to decide that, the case comes down to two relatively simple questions of fact which need to be determined beyond a reasonable doubt as to each defendant: did he use his position as a police officer as part of a conspiracy to shake down money from persons suspected of drug dealing, and to decide this you will have to decide who of the witnesses you believe and how much credence you will give to various documents and what their relationship is to the testimony you have heard.

Part of the Government's case against the defendants consisted of identification testimony, testimony
with respect to seeing a particular defendant at a
particular location in time.

Identification testimony must be weighed care-

the identification testimony was in a position to see and hear what he claims he saw and heard, whether his view was unobstructed, whether the lighting was good, whether he had good eyesight and hearing and whether he was a trianed observer and what the other factors may have been which may have interfered with his properly observing or remembering.

You may consider the passage of time from the observation in question in determining the reliability of the evidence. In weighing the testimony generally you may consider the relationship of the witness to the Government or to the defendants, the bias or interest in the outcome of the case, his or her manner while testifying, his or her candor, intelligence as you observed it; the sobriety at the time of the observation, the extent to which the witness was corroborated or contradicted by other credible evidence, moral or immoral acts of the witness and any arrangements made with the Government.

If you believe a witness has wilfully sworn falsely before you with respect to any material element of the case, you may disregard his or her testimony completely but each witness may of course have been

mistaten in part and accurate in part and you will have to decide which part of the testimony you believe.

The testimony of a witness may be discredited by showing that previously he or she made statements which were inconsistent with the present testimony.

The fact that a witness has been convicted of a crime may be considered by you as evidence of lack or morality which may make it more likely that he or she will lie on the witness stand. A person who has committed perjury must have his or her testimony even more carefully scrutinized.

You are not to give any greater weight or credibility of a witness who testifies in this case solely because of the fact that he is an employee of a governmental agency. His or her testimony is to be evaluated in the same manner as you would evaluate the testimony of any other witness.

be carefully scrutinized by you. In the first place, the fact that the witness committed a felony shows a defect in his character that may have made him more likely to lie on the witness stand. In the second place, he can be punished for his own offense so that he may try to court the prosecutor's favor and avoid

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Judge's charge

some regree of punishment himself or testify in return for advantages received.

The defendant Jimenez testified he never wrongfully obtained money while a police officer and that he never violated anyone's civil rights.

He has an interest in his acquittal and accordingly his testimony should be scrutinized with that fact in mind.

(continued next page)

Nothing I have said is to be taken as expressing any view of mine with respect to the credibility of any witness.

This is an importnat matter that you must decide.

The law does not prohibit the use of informers or alleged accomplices or the pleas or other arrangements which the witnesses described. Whether you aprove of the use of any promises or advantages given to witnesses should not enter into your decision as to whether these defendants are guilty or innocent. You should, however, consider the nature of the arrangements of the witnesses on the issue of their credibility.

The mere number of witnesses and documents has no necessary relationship to the burden of proof.

Your recollection of the evidence governs.

repeated you may make the request and I will call you into court and have the reporter read those portions you desire to hear. You can have anything read back to you. I suggest, however, that you be specific to avoid reading testimony you do not desire to assist you in your deliberations.

If you are confused you may send a note asking for help- on the law.

You are entitled to your own opinions but you should exchange views with your fellow jurors and listen carefully to each other. While you should not hestitate to change your opinion if you are convinced that another opinion is correct, your decision must be your own.

Any verdict you reach must be unanimous.

Your oath sums up your duty ----and that is without fear or favor to any man, you will well and truly try these issues before these parties according to the evidence given to you in court and the laws of the United States.

If you want any of the documents, send in a note and we will send them to you.

Now, is there any objection to my releasing the alternates?

MR. WASHOR: No.

MR. GREENBERG: No.

MR. SCHLAM: No.

THE COURTY The alternates are excused.

Get your things and return downstairs. Do not discuss this case with each other or anyone else until

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after the verdict is in.

Thank you very much.

Now, will the attorneys come to sidebar in case I have misspoken or mitted anything.

> (Sidebar discussion out of hearing of the jurors.)

MR. GREENBERG: No objections and no requests.

MR. WASHOR: On page 16, at the bottom of page 15, up to 16, the Court discusses advising the jury how to determine intent. I suppose by just inadvertant you left out, including the exhibits -- in other words, they can consider --

THE COURT: Oh, yes.

(In hearing of the jury:)

THE COURT: In deciding the intent o f the parties, in addition to the witnesses you have to consider the exhibits to the extent you think they bear on the question.

(Sidebar discussion out of hearing of the jury.)

MR. WASHOR: No other exceptions.

MR. SCHLAM: I have no exceptions.

(In hearing of the jury:)

THE COURT: Swear in the marshals. You have already filled out your lunchoen requests and we will

(At this time the marshals were thereupon

sworn.)

have that about 12:30.

THE COURT: All right, ladies and gentlemen, it is time for you to consider your verdict.

(The jury withdrew from the courtroom at 10:50 a.m.)

(continued next page)

(11:30 a.m.)

the pictures.

THE COURT: Have you examined the note, Court's Exhibit 3, gentlemen?

MR. SCHLAM: Y es, your Homor.

MR. WASHOR: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: May I have the p-ictures of the restaurant?

MR. WASHOR: We have agreed that these are

THE COURT: I am handing to the marshal Defendant's Exhibit L-4, L-3, L-5, L--2, and L-1.

The affidavit with initials?

MR. WASHOR: We have that.

THE COURT: That is Defendant's Exhibit Y and
I am handing that to the marshal.

The Lab Report?

MR. W_ASHOR: There are 3 documents related to the sectors.

the marshal will take those.

The log book?

MP. WASHOR: That is not in evidence.

THE COURT: I will tell them that.

The wiretap order?

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MR. WASHOR: There is a little problem with that. The one in evidence is Exhibit X is not a wiretap order for 88-10. It happens to be for the buildings right around the corner.

MR. SCHLAM: Let me see that a second?
MR. WASHOR: It is on Alvares and Velano.

THE COURT: I will explain that to the jury.

MR. WASHOR: The reason the exhibit related to 88-10 --

MR. SCHLAM: That is not what they asked for.

MR. WASHOR: If they are confusing the wiretap order for the premises, it has to be cleared up.

MR. SCHLAM: I just want to point out, your Honor, in the wiretap order, Defendant's Exhibit X, the addresses are Middle Village Queens and Jamaica Queens, which are not in the vicinity of Jackson Heights Queens.

THE COURT: Is that the plant for this order?

MR. WASHOR: Yes, 88-10, the storage basement area.

MR. SCHLAM: Your Honor, these two have nothing to do with this one. This is 3419. This is Velano and Alvarez.

MR. WASHOR: It may be part of it. We may have

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to look through it, I don't remember offhand.

THE COURT: The wiretap and order, Defendant's Exhibit X, February 17, order by Farrow. Defendant's Exhibit W refers to a Shapiro order of March.

MR. WASHOR: Can we see it, Judge?

There is such an order. I guess the only way to answer it, it's the follow up order apparently. Can't get any other orders into evidence.

Your Honor, I would ask that the pure explain the order that is in evidence is separate and distinct from 88-10, though there is an installation sheet showing a legitimate order going into evidence.

THE COURT: Whether it is legitimate or not, it indicates that there is a court order.

MR. SCHLAM: I will object to that. There is no basis in the record for making any statement like that. They offered into evidence a wiretap.

THE COURT: It does show that there was a plant.

MR. SCHLAM: They're not asking for a plant location. They are asking for a wiretap order. There is no wiretap order and that is the answer to their question.

MR. WASHOR: Except you cannot take it out of content.

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THE COURT: I'll explain it to them. I think it bears on the question.

You decided on what is to be read?

MR. WASHOR: How do you do that?

MR. SCHLAM: Direct and cross.

THE COURT: Where is it? , Let us get it.

Bring those exhibits in, Mr. Marshal. I will ask them and they will stop whenever they want to be stopped.

MR. SCHLAM: Your Honor, the Tange testimony begins at page 57.

THE COURT: Give that to the reporter.

MR. SCHLAM: It concludes at 188.

MR. WASHOR: This is eliminating all the colloguy.

MR. SCHLAM: Maurer's testimony starts at 459 and goes to 492.

(Jury present.)

THE COURT: You have asked for Jiminez' log book, the memo pad. That was not introduced into evidence. You cannot have it.

You have asked for a copy of a wiretap order for 33-10 34th Avenue. We do not have such an order in evidence. We do have, however, if you want to



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2	to see Defendant's Exhibit W, which shows a plant at
3	88 34th Avenue in the basement, pursuant to an
4	order. Do you want to see that?
5	THE FOREMAN: Yes.
6	THE COURT: Give it to the jury.
7	Now we have the testimony that you have asked
8	for. We have all of Tango's testiony and all of
9	Maurer's testimony. The Court Reporter will begin to
10	read it. It is quite a bit. As soon as you have
11	heard enough, let us know and we will stop reading.
12	Commence the reading, please.
13	(Testimony read from page 57 to page 73, line 3.)
14	THE COURT: Is that enough? Go on to the next.
15	THE FOREMAN: There's a question on the cross-
16	examination of Mr. Tange.
17	THE COURT: What do you want?
18	THE FOREMAN: As to whether or not he in fact
19	saw or distributed the money to the defendants himself.
20	MR. WASHOR: That is correct, your Honor.
21	THE COURT: Come to the sidebar and see if you can locate that.
22	Cuit 10cate that.
23	(The following transpired at the sidebar.)

your Honor. r and see if you he sidebar.) MR. WASHOR: I can help the Court with the page, I think.

1	1378
2	MR. GREENBERG: Page 139.
3	MR. WASHOR: And 140, I think.
4	MR. GREENBERG: Right.
5	THE COURT: May I see it?
6	(Shown to Court.)
7	THE COURT: We will start at 139, line 8 and
8	go through to 140, line 17, is that satisfactory?
9	MR. GREENBERG: Yes, Your Honor.
10	(The following transpired in open court.)
11	(Testimony read.)
12	THE COURT: Proceed to the next one.
13	(Testimony read from page 459 to page 468,
14	line 21.)
15	THE COURT: Y ou have heard enough?
16	THE FOREMAN: Yes.
17	(Jury leaves courtroom.)
18	THE COURT: Their lunch will come in at about
19	12:10. I suggest that you go to lunch from about
20	a quarter to 1:00 until 2:15 or so. You can take
21	a long lunch hour.
22	(Luncheon recess taken.)
23	* * *
24	2:30 p.m.
25	THE COURT: Have you found the testimony and

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agreed and on what they require? Court Exhibit 4?

MR. WASHOR: Yes. There are two areas of agreement. Before you took the bench, there were three areas of disagreement. Now there is no longer any disagreement.

THE COURT: What do you want read?

MR. WASHOR: Page 980, line 2 thru 15.

Page 1006, line 15 going to 1007 line 2.

THE COURT: They also want a bottle of ampirin.

Bring in the jury.

THE CLERK: Juror's note marked Court's Exhibit

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MR. WASHOR: Would you just indicate to them that there are just two portions to be read?

(Jury present.)

THE COURT: We think we found what you wanted and we have instructed the reporter to read the two portions. Will the reporter please read those portions?

THE COURT: All right, we will try to find the other testimony that you have asked for. It will take a little while. We will send in the aspirins.

(Jury leaves courtroom.)

(Testimony read.)

* * * *

THE COURT: Remain, please.

be able to do it now?

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1	(The following took place at 1381
2	sidebar.)
3	MR. WASHOR: May we have the question again?
4	THE COURT: The date Mr. Jiminez joined the
5	s.i.u.
6	Don't we have his personnel file?
7	MR. WASHOR: We never put it in.
8	(The following took place in op-en court.)
9	THE COURT: We will send a note in.
10	THE FOREMAN: Thank you.
11	(Jury leaves courtroom.)
12	MR. SCHLAM: This is it.
13	MR. WASHOR: I do not think anybody went beyond
14	that.
15	(Shown to Court.)
16	THE COURT: Is this satisfactory?
17	(Document shown to counsel.)
18	That will be marked Court's Exhibit 7.
19	Would you mind giving this Court Exhibit 7 to
20	the jury?
21	(Document handed to marshal.)
22	• • •
23	(continued next page)
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THE COURT: Well, I think I will bring them
in and if they do not want to continue to deliberate,
I will send them home if there is no objection?

MR. GREENBERG: No objection.

THE COURT: Bring the jury in please.

(Jury present.)

THE COURT: I can let you continue to deliberate if you think there is any chance of reaching a verdict within the next few hours, and I can send out for food, or I can let you go home, whichever you prefer, and come in the first thing in the morning? Whichever you would like to do? I do not know what the state of your deliberations are. Do you want to go back and think about it?

THE FOREMAN: The probability of reaching a verdict within two hours is extremely remote.

THE COURT: W-ould you rather go home and come in fresh in the morning? I do not want any of you to get sick or anything like that. I want you to be here promptly. All right, do not discuss the case until you are all here in the morning. I think 9:30 will be suitable. Can you all make it? Be here promptly at 9:30. The marshall will take all the exhibits and the things you have and return them in

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morning. Do not begin to deliberate until you are all here. Have a pleasant evening.

(Jury leaves courtroom.)

THE COURT: Good night, I do not think there is any need to be here promptly at 9:30. 10:00 I think would be early enough.

MR. WASHOR: We are leaving all the exhibits there, I suppose?

THE COURT: The Clerk will lock them up in a closet.

MR. WASHOR: In case they want it before we get here?

THE COURT: No, I won't give them any-thing until you are all present.

* * * **

AFFIDAVIT OF PERSONAL SERVICE

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF RICHMOND ss.:

EDWARD BAILEY being duly sworn, deposes and says, that deponent is not a party to the action, is over 18 years of age and resides at 286 Richmond Avenue, Staten Island, N.Y. 10302. That on the 29 day of Nov., 19 76 at No. 225 Cadman Plaza East., Brooklyn, NY

deponent servied the within Joint Appendix upon U.S. Atty., East. Dist. of NY

the Appellee herein, by delivering true copy (ies) thereof tohim personally. Deponent knew the person so served to be the person mentioned and described in said paper s the Appellee therein.

Sworn to before me this

29 day of Nov.

Edward Bailey

WILLIAM BAILEY

Notary Public, State of New York

No. 43-0132945

Qualified in Richmond County

Commission Expires March 30, 1978